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Collective Self-Defense: Nicaragua
v. United States
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 1984, the Republic of Nicaragua's ambassador to the
Netherlands instituted an action against the United States with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)' in the Hague, Netherlands. Nic-
aragua alleged numerous violations by the United States, of both gen-
eral international and treaty law.2 The most significant allegations
were the following: first, mining of Nicaraguan harbors; second, at-
tacking oil installations; third, exerting various forms of economic
pressure on Nicaragua3 and fourth, supporting armed bands of Nica-
raguan rebels opposed to the existing Sandinista government. 4
1. Communique of the International Court of Justice, Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) No. 86/8, June 27, 1986
[hereinafter Communique 86/8]; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 70, para. 1 (Judgment on Merits of June 27) [hereinafter
Nicar. v. U.S.].
2. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 15.
3. Id. para. 21. In addition to the mining of ports, there were ten unlawful acts which
Nicaragua charged the United States with:
(i.) 8 September 1983: an attack was made on Sandino international airport in
Managua by a Cessna aircraft, which was shot down;
(ii.) 13 September 1983: an underwater oil pipeline and part of the oil terminal
at Puerto Sandino were blown up;
(iii.) 2 October 1983: an attack was made on oil storage facilities at Benjamin
Zeledon on the Atlantic coast, causing the loss of a large quantity of fuel;
(iv.) 10 October 1983: an attack was made by air and sea on the port of
Corinto, involving the destruction of five oil storage tanks, the loss of millions of
gallons of fuel, and the evacuation of large numbers of the local population;
(v.) 14 October 1983: the underwater oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino was again
blown up;
(vi.) 4/5 January 1984: an attack was made by speedboats and helicopters us-
ing rockets against the Potosi Naval Base;
(vii.) 24/25 February 1984: an incident at El Bluff listed under this date ap-
pears to be the mine explosion already mentioned... ;
(viii.) 7 March 1984: an attack was made on [an] oil and storage facility at San
Juan del Sur by speedboats and helicopters;
(ix.) 28/30 March 1984: clashes occurred at Puerto Sandino between speed-
boats, in the course of minelaying operations, and Nicaraguan patrol boats; interven-
tion by a helicopter in support of the speedboats;
(x.) 9 April 1984: a helicopter allegedly launched from a mother ship in inter-
national waters provided fire support for an ARDE attack on San Juan del Norte.
Id. para. 81.
4. The "Sandinistas" are a coalition of the National Liberation Front and other leftist
guerilla groups in Nicaragua which together overthrew the former Somoza regime. See infra
text accompanying notes 14-16.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 10:449
The United States' initial response to the complaint was that the
ICJ lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of this partic-
ular dispute.5 Following the court's assertion of jurisdiction on No-
vember 26, 1984,6 the United States refused to appear before the court
to defend itself on the merits.7 Notwithstanding the United States'
absence, the court addressed the merits of the case, and on June 27,
1986, issued its decision. The court found that the United States had
violated several tenets of customary international law by its activities
in and against Nicaragua.
8
At the heart of the United States' defense of its actions, as por-
trayed to the United States public and the international community, is
the general international legal theory of "collective self-defense." 9
Specifically, the United States defended its actions by maintaining
that Nicaragua's Sandinista regime was channeling arms through
Nicaraguan harbors and territory in an effort to overthrow the ex-
isting government of El Salvador.10 Thus, the United States argued
that under a nation's inherent right of collective self-defense, Nicara-
gua's conduct permitted the United States to undertake "necessary
actions" to support El Salvador. However, there are specific prerequi-
sites to reliance on the doctrine of collective self-defense, as well as
limits to its application."
This Note is primarily concerned with the potential impact of the
5. See infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
6. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 9.
7. Id. para. 11.
8. Communique 86/8, supra note 1, para. 2-7. One prominent violation was that the
United States breached its obligations under customary international law not to intervene in
the internal affairs of another state when it lent military support to the Nicaraguan contras.
The United States was also charged with laying mines in Nicaraguan ports during 1984. Id.
para. 6; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. This theory has manifested itself in many areas of international jurisprudence and is
also embodied in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
10. N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1984, at Al, col. 6. While the United States did not appear
before the court to defend on the merits, this newspaper article concludes that the United
States' activities, specifically the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, was justified as a form of de-
fense for El Salvador and its allies. Id. In fact, in their Counter-Memorial on jurisdiction and
admissibility, the United States asserted that they were acting "pursuant to the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defence." Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 126. In support
of their claim that circumstances in El Salvador triggered their right to intervene in Nicaragua,
the United States pointed to El Salvador's Declaration of Intervention filed on August 15,
1984. Therein, El Salvador officially declared that it was under an "armed attack" by Nicara-
gua. Id. paras. 235-36. Moreover, El Salvador formally requested assistance by the United
States. Id. para. 233. As discussed below, this is a crucial prerequisite to successfully invoking
collective self-defense. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
Nicaragua v. United States
ICJ's decision on the court's credibility. Specifically, this Note ad-
dresses the court's highly ambitious application of the collective self-
defense doctrine in light of the doctrine's origin and purpose in the
international legal arena. In addition, this Note points out several
potential problems with the court's first application of the doctrine in
the hope that future applications will be sound and follow
precedent. 12
II. BACKGROUND
The current differences between Nicaragua and the United States
began in July, 1979 when the present Nicaraguan government, the
Frente Sandanista de Liberacion Nacional (FSCN) 13 overthrew Presi-
dent Anastasio Somoza Debayle. This change in the government,
coupled with the United States' suspicion that the Soviet Union sup-
ported the Sandinistas, raised fears that the close diplomatic and eco-
nomic ties the United States enjoyed with countries in Central
America were in jeopardy. 14 In response to these fears, the Carter
Administration sought to transform the leftist Sandinista regime into
a democracy by offering economic assistance as an incentive.15 How-
ever, during the Reagan Administration, relations have become in-
creasingly strained, 16 and the United States now openly supports the
anti-Sandinista guerrillas, or as they are more commonly known, the
"contras". 17 One of President Reagan's stated concerns is that Nica-
ragua is providing aid to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador by funneling
Soviet arms through its ports and across its territory, thus threatening
the El Salvadoran government, and United States security interests in
the region. 8
In early 1984, national press releases indicated that the United
12. For one instance of the court's problematic analysis, see infra notes 84-85 and accom-
panying text.
13. Note, Nicaragua v. United States: The Power of the International Court of Justice to
Indicate Interim Measures in Political Disputes, 4 DICK. INT'L L.J. 65, 66 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Interim Measures]; see also Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 18.
14. See generally L. LANGLEY, CENTRAL AMERICA: THE REAL STAKES 3-16 (1985);
TROUBLE IN OUR BACKYARD (M. Diskin ed. 1983); Note, Interim Measures, supra note 13, at
66.
15. Note, Interim Measures, supra note 13, at 65.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 66.
18. Id.
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States had precipitated the mining of Nicaraguan harbors19 through
the Central Intelligence Agency. 20 These activities, presumably
aimed at preventing the flow of arms through Nicaragua, motivated
Nicaragua to file its action with the ICJ on April 9, 1984. As noted
above, the United States contested the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court.21 Notwithstanding this objection, on May 10, 1984, the
court granted Nicaragua's request for an indication of interim meas-
ures of protection.22 Specifically, based on Nicaragua's charges, the
court temporarily enjoined the United States from continuing any
military or paramilitary activities in the Central American region.23
On November 26, 1984, the court determined that it had jurisdic-
tion to hear the case.24 The court's conclusion relied on the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute),25 and the United
States' statement of jurisdiction to the United Nations. 26 In response,
the United States' agent to the court wrote a letter stating that "the
United States intends not to participate in any further proceedings in
connection with this case, and reserves its rights in respect of any
decision by the Court regarding Nicaragua's claims."' 27
The United States did not file a pleading as ordered by the Presi-
dent of the Court.28 Consequently, in light of the absence of the
United States, Nicaragua urged the court to decide the merits of the
case pursuant to Article 53 of the ICJ Statute.29 Article 53 states that
"[w]henever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or
19. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1984, at Al, col. 3; Note, Interim Measures, supra
note 13, at 66 n.10.
20. Note, Interim Measures, supra note 13, at 66.
21. Note, Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.):
The International Court of Justice's Jurisdictional Dilemma, 7 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
379 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Jurisdictional Dilemma]. This Note addressed the jurisdictional
issues with respect to Nicaragua's request for interim measures of protection.
22. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 3.
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1984
I.C.J. 169 (Interim Protection Order of May 10), reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 468
(1984) [hereinafter Interim Order]; Note, Interim Measures, supra note 13, at 66, 67.
24. Communique of the International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activi-
ties in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) No. 84/39, June 27, 1986 [hereinafter Communi-
que 84/39].
25. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, para. 2 [hereinafter ICJ Statute];
Communique 84/39, supra note 24, Judgment of Court, para. 1. The ICJ Statute is part of the
United Nations Charter, and sets forth the rules under which the court functions as a tribunal.
26. 1972-1973 I.C.J.Y.B. 81 (1973) [hereinafter Statement of Acceptance].
27. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 10.
28. Id. para. 11.
29. Id. para. 28.
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fails to defend its case, the other party may call upon the Court to
decide in favor of its claim."' 30 The court acceded to Nicaragua's re-
quest and proceeded to reach the merits of the case.
III. PRELIMINARY CHOICE OF LAW AND
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES.
The formerly adjudicated jurisdictional issue played a prominent
role in the court's analysis of the merits of this dispute.31 Specifically,
an important choice of law issue was resolved by referring to the
United States' statement of consent to the court's jurisdiction.
Briefly, the choice of law arguments were as follows.
Nicaragua and the United States joined the United Nations
agreement on October 24, 1945.32 Article 36, paragraph 2 of the ICJ
Statute (Optional Clause) states that, "[t]he states parties to the pres-
ent Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory
... the jurisdiction of the Court.. . . ",33 The United States deposited
its acceptance of jurisdiction on August 26, 1946. However, in its
recognition of the Court's jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, the
United States expressly excluded its application to "disputes arising
under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected
by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the
United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction. ' 3
4
The United States argued that since Nicaragua sought to enforce
obligations of the United States arising under several multilateral
treaties, 35 the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case because El
Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica would be "affected," and were
30. ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art. 53. The court states, without any authority, that
interpretations of this provision have held that in the absence of one of the parties the court
must "satisfy itself" that the claims of the applicant are "well founded in fact and law." Ni-
car. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 28. Thus, the court will never automatically declare judgment
in favor of the appearing party.
31. For a thorough discussion of the precise jurisdictional issues decided, see Note, Juris-
dictional Dilemma, supra note 21, 379-82.
32. U.N. CHARTER; R. RUSSELL, THE UNITED NATIONS AND UNITED STATES SECUR-
ITY POLICY 476 (1968).
33. ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art. 36, para. 2.
34. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 42; Statement of Acceptance, supra note 26.
35. The multilateral treaties discussed.., at the stage of the proceedings devoted to
jurisdiction were four in number: The Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of
the Organization of American States, the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States of 26 December 1933, and the Havana Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife of 20 February 1928.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 47.
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not parties to the action. 36 The court did not pass on this issue at the
jurisdictional phase, stating that "it was not found possible for the
reservation [regarding multilateral treaties] to be definitively dealt
with at the jurisdictional stage of the proceedings. ' 37 However, in its
decision on the merits, the court concluded that the reservation did
apply to any claims Nicaragua had which were dependent on obliga-
tions arising under those treaties. Moreover, they stated that "El Sal-
vador, a party to the United Nations Charter and to the Charter of
the Organization of American States, is a State which would be 'af-
fected' by the decision which the Court would have to take [sic] on
the claims by Nicaragua .... ,,38
In reaching this decision, the court also concluded that "the ef-
fect of the reservation in question is confined to barring the applicabil-
ity of the United Nations Charter and OAS Charter as multilateral
treaty law, and has no further impact on the sources of international
law which Article 38 of the Statute requires the Court to apply."39 Ini-
tially, this seems to support the United States' position. However, the
effect of this conclusion is illusory. As discussed below, the court left
itself considerable room with which to decide the case based entirely
on the doctrine of collective self-defense.4° Ironically, the very law
that the court excluded, i.e., the doctrine of collective self-defense as
embodied in the U.N. and OAS charters, was precisely the law that
resulted in the judgment against the United States.
4 1
36. Id. para. 48.
37. Id. para. 43. The court explained its refusal to make a determination as to the appli-
cation of the reservation by noting that it would be required to give a "definitive interpretation
of the term 'affected'...." Id. The court held that this determination would require investi-
gation into "matters of substance relating to the merits of the case." Id. Since only prelimi-
nary matters may be heard by the ICJ at the jurisdictional phase of a case, the court postponed
a decision on this issue.
38. Id. para. 56.
39. Id. (emphasis added). Article 38 of the ICJ Statute reads:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; ....
ICJ Statute, supra note 25, art. 38, para. 1. Under this article, it is plain that the court has an
extremely wide range of sources from which it may derive international laws.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 68-72.
41. Id. Given that the court so limited the applicable law in the absence of an appearance
by the U.S., clearly to the benefit of the U.S., the court may be seen as trying to appease an
absent United States by going as far as possible in protecting its interests. See Note, Jurisdic-
tional Dilemma, supra note 21, at 408. On the other hand, the decision to exclude these trea-
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IV. COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
A. Development of the Theory
Since the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the
United States has essentially policed the Americas. "Enunciated in
1904, [the Roosevelt Corollary] set forth the 'right' of the United
States to exercise an 'international police power' in the [western]
hemisphere." 42 However, near the close of World War II, Latin
American countries began to grow uneasy at the prospect of the
United States as a superpower. 43 Specifically, they feared that the
'United States' numerous global commitments would take precedence
over the regional interests it had formerly protected." Moreover,
they feared the plans for the formation of the United Nations as a
world security organization since it would be run predominantly by
the world's most powerful countries. 45 Finally, for conservative re-
gimes in the area, there was a fear that the Soviets could exert influ-
ence in the region through their participation in the United Nations.46
Due to the fears of the Latin American countries discussed
above, regional pressure was exerted against the United States. In
February of 1945, as a result of this pressure, the United States was
persuaded to accept a "Resolution Concerning Reciprocal Assistance
and American Solidarity," which became known as the Treaty of
Chapultepec47 Since this treaty effectively created a collective secur-
ity system for the region, the United States found itself faced with a
conflict of interests. On the one hand, it had rights and obligations
under the United Nations treaty to protect global interests. On the
other hand, it had rights and obligations under the Treaty of Chapul-
tepec to promote and protect regional interests. Thus, the Central
American nations, aligned with the United States under the Treaty of
Chapultepec, feared that in the case of an emergency the United
States would subordinate its regional obligations in favor of protecting
its global interests as a superpower.48
ties is relatively insignificant in that the court derives identical laws under customary
international law. See infra text accompanying notes 63-75.
42. M. ZACHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 1946-77, 89
(1979). For a general discussion of the subpart, see id.
43. Id. at 92.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
1988]
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In seeking to harmonize this potential conflict of interest, the
United States was forced to seek a way of reconciling the forces of the
inter-American organization with those of the United Nations.4 9 This
reconciliation manifested itself in the codification of the doctrine of
collective self-defense in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, or
what is sometimes referred to as the "Vandenberg Resolution." 50 Ar-
ticle 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Se-
curity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.5'
This resolution attempted to remove the possibility that a perma-
nent member of the U.N. Security Council could, by using its veto
power, prevent justified regional responses to aggression.5 2 The reso-
lution, by recognizing that a state has an inherent right to protect
itself from outside aggression, gave tacit approval to the justifiable
exercise of force if the United Nations refused to act. Moreover, it
provided a basis upon which the United States could build a security
organization in the Western Hemisphere consistent with its growing
international commitments, both within and without the newly
formed United Nations.5 3
In 1948, three years after the Treaty of Chapultepec, all the
American countries followed the trend to develop regional organiza-
tions for the maintenance of peace and established the Organization of
American States (OAS). 5 4 The OAS Charter included a regional se-
curity arrangement, and embodied some of the foreign policies that
had developed in prior years. Most notably, the charter reflected its
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
52. M. ZACHER, supra note 42, at 92. This principle seems to reflect an inherent right
under principles of natural law to protect oneself from outside aggression. But see infra note
73 and accompanying text.
53. M. ZACHER, supra note 42, at 92.
54. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. no. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; M. ZACHER, supra note 42, at 93.
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members', "recognition of the sovereignty and independence of all
states, opposition to aggression, the peaceful settlement of disputes,
[and] the principles of collective security and continental solidarity
"55
To the United States, the OAS arrangement was more important
in repelling the extra-regional Communist threat than it was to
preventing any regional threat. 56 The Latin American countries con-
sidered the primary significance to be the United States' expression of
a "good neighbor" relationship between all American nations. This
relationship was expected to shield Latin American countries from
"Yankee imperialism. ' 57 Notwithstanding these differences in expec-
tations, most of the member nations shared a common interest in their
opposition to membership by any communist or communist-sup-
ported government. 58 Thus, the OAS was partially established, at
least as far as the United States was concerned, to impede the influx of
communism into the hemisphere.
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio
Treaty) 59 was another regional treaty consistent with the United Na-
tions Charter on the issue of collective self-defense. 6° Thus, as does
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the Rio Treaty distinguishes between
armed attacks and other acts of aggression. The Rio Treaty states
that when an armed attack occurs within the region, each member
may "determine the immediate measures which it may individually
take to meet the attack."'6 Further:
[i]n situations where an American state is threatened by an act of
aggression other than an armed attack, an outside conflict, or "any
other act or situation" endangering the peace of the hemisphere,
the Organ is also to meet without delay to agree on measures to
assist the victim of aggression or maintain the security of the
continent.
62
This is the present state of the doctrine of collective self-defense
55. M. ZACHER, supra note 42, at 93.
56. R. RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 15. The organization gave the United States the much
needed leverage required to justify its continued efforts to repel communist influences in the
area.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 179.
59. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocol Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681,
T.I.A.S. no. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77.
60. M. ZACHER, supra note 42, at 94.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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as it pertains to the United States' regional interests, as well as its
interests under the United Nations Charter.
B. Collective Self-Defense as a Matter of Customary
International Law
Despite the court's decision that the multilateral treaty reserva-
tion barred it from addressing Nicaragua's contention that the United
States violated the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter and
the OAS treaties, 63 the court concluded that "it [could] and must
take [these conventions] into account in ascertaining the content of
the customary international law which the United States is also al-
leged to have infringed." 64
Nicaragua's claims in this action arise under Article 2, paragraph
4 of the U.N. Charter. This Article states that, "[a]ll Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations. ' 65 Since the U.N. Charter could not be used as a basis for a
finding against the United States due to the multilateral treaty reser-
vation, the court looked to whether the mandate of Article 2 had an
independent basis in customary international law.6 6
The court began its inquiry by examining the United States' past
conduct in the international arena. Attention was drawn to the
United States' support of the resolution of the Sixth International
Conference of American States condemning aggression, as well as rat-
ification of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of
States. 67 Article 11 of the Montevideo Convention imposed the obli-
gation not to recognize territory acquired by force. 68 Additionally,
the court recognized that the United States had accepted the prohibi-
tion of the use of force in the Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe.69 There, the participating nations agreed to refrain
63. See supra text accompanying notes 31-41.
64. Nicar v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 183. It is unclear why the court felt compelled to
resort to the U.N. Charter to discern principles of customary international law in light of the
fact that under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, it has wide authority to develop these principles
in other ways. See supra note 39. This tactic is even more troubling given that the U.N.
Charter was excluded under the multilateral treaty reservation.
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
66. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 187.
67. Id. para. 189.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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from the threat or use of force. The court concluded that
"[a]cceptance of a text in these terms confirms the existence of an
Opinio juris of the participating States prohibiting the use of force in
international relations."' 70 The court found this to be tantamount to
an acceptance of a principle of customary international law on the
issue.71 Under this theory the court was able to hold the United
States responsible for a violation of this principle apart from any ref-
erence to the U.N. Charter.
The court continued:
[a] further confirmation of the validity as customary international
law of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed
in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations
may be found in the fact that it is frequently referred to in state-
ments by State representatives as being not only a principle of cus-
tomary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal
principle of such law.
72
While recognizing the principle of non-intervention by use of
force as a fundamental matter of customary international law, the
court recognized certain exceptions-specifically the right of collec-
tive self-defense. The court first examined whether this right existed
apart from its codification in the U.N. Charter. Again, its analysis
began with the language of Article .51 of the U.N. Charter, the sub-
stantive content of which was held inapplicable. The court stated that
the Charter recognized an "inherent right" 73 which all states possess
70. Id. The court's reasoning on this point is strained since according to the language
quoted by the court, the nations present at this conference merely agreed to refrain from the
threat or use of force. Id. The court interprets this as a "prohibition" of the threat or use of
force.
71. Id.
72. Id. para. 190. The court's argument on this issue is that since the U.S. has shown its
interest in refraining from the threat or use of force in other areas of international relations,
this interest must be a customary principle of international law. While this is a weak inference,
it is proper in light of the court's broad authority to discern general principles of international
law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. See supra note 39.
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Hans Kelsen criticizes this interpretation of Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter by quoting Article 51 and then stating:
This provision presupposes the existence of the right of self-defence as established,
not by positive international law, but by natural law, for it speaks of an "inherent"
right. This is a theoretical opinion of the legislator which has no legal importance.
The effect of Article 51 would not change if the term 'inherent' were dropped. In
declaring that nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-defence,
the Charter confers such right upon the Members, whether positive general interna-
tional law establishes it or not.
HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 791-92 (1950). Kelsen also sets forth a
definition of self-defense under natural or customary international law. He states:
1988] 459
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in the event of an armed attack. 74 Thus, the court concluded that the
Charter itself recognized the existence of the right of collective self-
defense, independent of the Charter, in customary international law.
75
The court's apparent error in immediately turning to the body of
law it had just held to be inapplicable, i.e., the U.N. Charter, may be
more a matter of form than substance. Specifically, the court had
rejected the U.N. Charter as applicable to decide the "merits" of the
dispute. However, in turning to the Charter as a possible reflection of
customary international law, arguably the court did not infringe upon
matters the United States sought to protect by invoking the multilat-
eral treaty reservation.76 Nonetheless, the court appears to be walk-
ing a fine analytical line on an important element of the case. 77
C. Application of Collective Self-Defense in this Case
In setting the parameters for the application of the doctrine of
collective self-defense, the court began by stating that under the doc-
The right of self-defence, according to the natural-law doctrine, is the right of an
individual, or a state, to defend his person, property or honour against a real or
imminent attack. It is a right of the attacked or threatened individual or state, and of
no other individual or state. Article 51 confers the right to use force not only upon
the attacked state but also upon other states which unite with the attacked state in
order to assist it in its defence. This is probably the meaning of the term "collective
self-defence .... " Collective defence exists if two or more states organise their de-
fence against attack from third states by concluding a treaty obliging or authorising
the contracting parties to assist one another in case one of them is attacked by a third
state.
Id. (emphasis added).
Kelsen suggests that only the attacked or threatened state has a natural right of self de-
fense under customary international law. He defines collective self-defense as the product of
treaties between nations, seemingly rejecting the idea that the doctrine exists as a separate tenet
of customary international law. Therefore, since the court found the United Nations Charter
and the OAS Charter inapplicable due to the United States' multilateral treaty reservation,
arguably, the court should not have found any right of collective self-defense in this case. This
is probably the thrust of Judge Oda's dissent wherein he criticizes the court for not exploring
the doctrine more closely. See infra text accompanying note 120.
Finally, quite ironically, the court ignored the right of collective defense set forth in the
Treaty of Chapultepec, the Rio Treaty and the OAS Charter presumably because of the United
States' multilateral treaty reservation. See text accompanying notes 43-62.
74. The court noted that the requirement of an armed attack applied not only to collec-
tive self-defense, but also to individual self-defense. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 193.
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 43-53.
77. It should be noted that this is the same tactic employed by the court to determine that
the United States' conduct, as alleged by Nicaragua, violated customary international law. See
supra note 64 and accompanying text. However, for a discussion of the doctrine of collective
self-defense and its development apart from the U.N. Charter, see generally M. ZACHER, supra
note 42.
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trine of individual self-defense, the state invoking the doctrine must be
the victim of an armed attack. 78 In the case of collective self-defense,
the state allegedly being defended must be the victim of an armed
attack.79 Thus, the court unequivocally stated that in order to find
that the United States lawfully exercised the right, it must find that
Nicaragua engaged in an armed attack against El Salvador, Honduras
or Costa Rica. 80 The essential question, then, is what constitutes an
armed attack.
In defining an armed attack, the court looked to Article 3, para-
graph (g) of the Definition of Aggression which was annexed to Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX),1 The court felt Article 3,
paragraph (g) reflected customary international law. 82 The court
stated:
it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces
across an international border, but also "the sending by or on be-
half of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to. . ." an actual armed attack conducted by
regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein. '8 3
Unfortunately, this definition of an armed attack provides little
or no guidance in understanding the type of action constituting an
armed attack. The court merely states that an armed attack occurs
when the use of armed force against another state is of such gravity
that it amounts to an armed attack. This is a tautology which simply
begs the question under consideration: what constitutes an armed
attack?
Notwithstanding the court's failure to articulate a meaningful
definition, they nevertheless expressly rejected the idea that "assist-
ance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or
other support," constituted an armed attack.8 4 The court indicated
78. See supra note 74.
79. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 195.
80. Id. para. 229.
81. Id. para. 195.
82. Id.
83. Id. On this issue in particular, the court must articulate a more meaningful standard
to be applied in all cases. This is crucial since this is the first case in which the court has
addressed the issue of collective self-defense. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22. Fi-
nally, this will provide a means of reaching consistent decisions, which in turn will lead to
increased credibility of the court by the nations subscribing to its jurisdiction.
84. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 195.
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that in order for them to find that an armed attack warranting inter-
vention had occurred, not only must the attacked state declare that
they are under attack, but they must also request the help of the inter-
vening state.85 The court expressly rejected the notion that the inter-
vening state can, on its own assessment, exercise its right of collective
self-defense.8 6
1. The United States' Justification for Exercising
Collective Self-Defense
The United States asserted its right to exercise collective self-de-
fense on behalf of El Salvador at the jurisdictional stage of the court
proceedings in its "Counter-Memorial on jurisdiction and admissibil-
ity."'8 7 At this stage of the proceeding, the United States justified its
intervention in Nicaragua as a response to requests from El Salvador,
Honduras and Costa Rica for assistance in repelling Nicaraguan ag-
gression.88 The United States clearly stated that Nicaragua "pro-
moted and supported guerrilla violence in neighboring countries,"
particularly in El Salvador.
8 9
Furthermore, United States Secretary of State, George P.
Schultz, filed an affidavit with the court wherein he declared:
The United States has abundant evidence that the Government of
Nicaragua has actively supported armed groups engaged in mili-
tary and paramilitary activities in and against El Salvador ....
The Government of Nicaragua also participates directly in the pro-
curement, and transshipment through Nicaraguan territory, of
large quantities of ammunition, supplies and weapons for the
armed groups conducting military and paramilitary activities in
and against El Salvador. 90
Nicaragua emphatically denied that it was passing arms on to the
El Salvadoran rebels. Notwithstanding this denial, the court found it
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. para. 126.
88. Id. The court noted two problems with these requests which the court felt rendered
them insufficient: first, they were not made until this action had been commenced, and second,
the court felt that the requests may have been made at the suggestion of the United States. Id.
para. 165.
89. Id. para. 128.
90. Id. The court stated that it would treat this evidence with great reserve, as it came
from what they termed a "Minister" of one of the party states. It recognized that a national
bias necessarily comes into play, especially on controverted issues. Id. paras. 70, 128.
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had significant evidence to the contrary. 91 Part of this evidence came
from Dr. David MacMichael, a witness for Nicaragua who was a full-
time employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in Inter-American
affairs from March 1981 to April 1983.92 On the basis of information
available to him in that capacity, he conceded, under examination by
the court, that in his opinion the Nicaraguan government was supply-
ing arms to the Salvadoran insurgency in late 1980 through early
198 1.
93
To further deny that it had any role in arming El Salvadoran
rebels, Nicaragua offered the direct testimony of Miguel d'Escoto
Brockmann, Nicaragua's foreign minister.94 Moreover, Nicaragua
maintained that if arms were being transported across their borders,
they were not responsible for it nor could they prevent it.95
Brockmann had pointed to the logistical problems in preventing the
flow of arms due to the rugged and often inaccessible terrain along the
Nicaraguan borders. He stated that, "as a small underdeveloped
country with extremely limited resources, and with no modern or so-
phisticated detection equipment, it is not easy for [Nicaragua] to seal
off [its] borders to all unwanted and illegal traffic."' 96 In addition, he
stated that the presence of the contras has made the task even more
difficult.
9 7
The court took into consideration one other piece of evidence in
reaching its decision on whether or not Nicaragua was passing arms
91. The court found sufficient evidence to hold that between the end of 1980 and the
beginning of 1981, the Nicaraguan government was responsible for arms flow to El Salvador.
Communique 86/8, supra note 1, at 11.
92. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 134.
93. Id. paras. 135-37.
94. Id. para. 147.
95. Id. Mr. Brockmann denied that his government was supplying El Salvadoran rebels
with arms. He stated:
In truth, my government is not engaged, and has not been engaged, in the provision
of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged in the civil war in El
Salvador .... Since my government came to power on July 19, 1979, its policy and
practice has been to prevent our national territory from being used as a conduit for
arms or other military supplies intended for other governments or rebel groups. In
fact, on numerous occasions the security forces of my government have intercepted
clandestine arms shipments, apparently destined for El Salvador, and confiscated
them.
Id.
96. Id. Dr. MacMichael also testified that even the United States, with its sophisticated
detection equipment, has not confirmed arms shipment. Id. para. 135.
97. Id. This is a strange argument for Nicaragua to make in that it supports an argument
by the United States that outside intervention was necessary to control the arms flow that
Nicaragua could not do on its own.
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to El Salvadoran rebels. This evidence was that in March of 1981, at
the United States' urging, Nicaragua took swift steps to prevent a
Nicaraguan airstrip from continuing to be used to funnel arms.98 The
court believed that, "[t]he promptness with which the Nicaraguan au-
thorities closed off this channel [strongly indicated] that it was in fact
being used, or had been used for such a purpose." 99 Thus, in the
courts opinion, Nicaragua had admitted the existence of an airstrip
that had been designed to handle small aircraft, most likely for pur-
poses of transporting weapons to El Salvador. 1°°
With respect to El Salvador, the court found that between July of
1979 and the early months of 1981, an intermittent flow of arms had
passed through Nicaraguan territory to the armed opposition in El
Salvador. 10 1 However, there was no evidence that any such further
activity occurred after 198 1.102 Furthermore, the court was not satis-
fied that this activity was imputable to the Nicaraguan government. 0 3
Finally, the court stated that, assuming the activity was attributable
to Nicaragua, under customary international law, the provision of
arms to the opposition in another country does not constitute an
armed attack sufficient to trigger the right of collective self-defense.'°4
The court considered many factors in concluding that an armed
attack had not occurred. First, it stated that the victim country, "be-
ing the most directly aware"1°5 of an armed attack against it, is likely
to draw attention to the situation. 06 Under this assumption the court
found it significant that, notwithstanding several opportunities to do
so, El Salvador did not declare itself under an armed attack until just
prior to the commencement of this action.
0 7
Another factor the court felt weighed against the United States'
position was the language of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Although the court expressly concluded that it was not relying on the
98. Id. paras. 136, 151.
99. Id. para. 151.
100. The court did not indicate why it felt this evidence was stronger than other evidence
before it. However, this seemed to tilt the scales against Nicaragua on this issue.
101. Id. paras. 160, 230.
102. Id. para. 230.
103. Id.
104. The court relied on its previous definition of an armed attack to conclude that "the
provision of arms to the opposition in another State [does not constitute] an armed attack on
that state." Id; see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
105. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 232.
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 233.
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law contained therein,108 it stated that Article 51 expressly requires
that notice be given to the United Nations Security Council regarding
the action to be taken.1°9 Since the United States did not notify the
Security Council of its actions, the court believed collective self-de-
fense did not apply. The court stated:
The Court, whose decision has to be made on the basis of custom-
ary international law.... does not therefore treat the absence of a
report... as the breach of [a requirement] .... But the Court is
justified in observing that this conduct of the United States hardly
conforms with the latter's avowed conviction that it was acting in
the context of collective self-defence as consecrated by Article 51
of the Charter. I 10
Moreover, the court concluded that "the condition sine qua non
required for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence by the
United States is not fulfilled in this case. '"1  The court continued:
"[a]ccordingly, the Court concludes that the plea of collective self-
defence against an alleged armed attack on El Salvador, Honduras or
Costa Rica, advanced by the United States to justify its conduct to-
ward Nicaragua, cannot be upheld . . . ,1112
2. The Court's Reasoning Regarding Collective Self-Defense
There are several problems with the court's reasoning in its ap-
plication and discussion of collective self-defense. First, the United
States was not present at the trial on the merits, and under Article 38
of the ICJ Statute, the court should only have been concerned with
satisfying itself that Nicaragua's claim was "well founded in fact and
law.""' 3 Thus, the court seemingly overstepped its bounds to the ex-
tent that it concerned itself with possible defenses to the United
States' actions. The court reached the collective self-defense issue by
relying on the United States' raising of the issue at the jurisdictional
phase. However, the court did not adequately explain why this allows
it to look beyond merely deciding whether or not Nicaragua's claim
was "well founded in fact and law."' 14 While the final result may not
have been different, had the mandate of Article 38 been followed, a
108. Id. para. 235.
109. Id.; U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
110. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 235.
111. Id. para. 237 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. para. 238.
113. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
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decision on the issue of collective self-defense would not have been
made. "15
Second, assuming that the court properly reached the collective
self-defense issue, the court failed to examine the purpose of the doc-
trine in applying it to the facts. In this case, application of the doc-
trine runs counter to its historical development and its intended use.
As noted above, the right to exercise the doctrine of collective self-
defense under the United Nations Charter evolved from the fear that
a veto by a permanent member of the Security Council would prevent
regional action against aggression.1 16 Under customary international
law, the doctrine was intended to bestow upon a smaller country the
ability to defend itself, in concert with others.' 17 This was based on
an "inherent right" of self-defense." 18
In this case, the United States acted unilaterally against one of
the countries that collective self-defense was designed to protect. The
court overlooked the logical assumption that the United States in-
voked the doctrine as a pretext to support its policy of opposing the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and supporting the present govern-
ment of El Salvador.
Third, the court held that the multilateral treaty reservation pre-
cluded the application of all of the relevant treaty law. However, the
court later returned to these treaties both to determine that collective
self-defense was a principle of customary international law, and that
the United States had not properly invoked the doctrine.' 9
The court may also be criticized in not exploring the parameters
of the doctrine more carefully, especially since this was the court's
first case based on the issue. Judge Oda criticizes the court by stating:
[I] regret that the Court has been needlessly precipitate in giving its
views on collective self-defence in its first Judgment to broach that
subject... [E]ven if it was necessary for the court to take up the
concept of collective self-defence... this concept should have been
more extensively probed by the Court in its first Judgment to
115. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
116. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
117. Id. para. 193. But see, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
118. Id. para. 193. But see, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 72-75, 108-111 and accompanying text. Moreover, the court proba-
bly was in error when they found that collective self-defense was a principle of natural or
customary international law. See supra note 73.
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broach the subject. 120
Notwithstanding the analytical problems outlined above, the
court arrived at a correct result. There was substantial evidence that
the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had
equipped and directed the contras in most of the ten activities
charged. Naturally, the court had very little direct evidence in sup-
port of the United States' position since it did not appear before the
court. However, the court was satisfied that:
the United States of America, by training, arming, equipping, fi-
nancing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging,
supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua
121
The court's imprecise reasoning may not be of any consequence
in this case, since the proper result was reached. However, it does
create, or in fact exacerbate, a credibility problem in the eyes of both
subscribing and non-subscribing nations around the world. In addi-
tion, in light of Judge Oda's criticism for the court's "precipitate"
analysis of collective self-defense, the court may have created bad
precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
The International Court of Justice held the United States liable
for mining Nicaraguan harbors. In reaching this decision, the court
was faced with the United States' multilateral treaty reservation
which forced it to disregard essentially all of the relevant treaty law.
Thus, the decision had to be based upon principles of customary inter-
national law. However, the court's derivation and analysis of these
principles was problematic.
The court abandoned its self-defined task of merely satisfying it-
self that Nicaragua's claims are "well founded in fact and law." In-
stead, it entertained a potential defense for the United States 122 on an
120. Communique 86/8, supra note 1, at 5; Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, para. 96 (Oda, J.,
dissenting).
121. Communique 86/8, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasis in original).
122. In most, if not all courts in the United States, an absent party will have a default
judgment entered against it. All the appearing party has to do is make a prima facie showing
of the elements of the offense as well as on the measure of damages and judgment will be
entered accordingly. Thus, the court is never faced with having to entertain hypothetical de-
fenses as the ICJ did here.
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important issue not previously addressed by the court. Specifically, it
applied the doctrine of collective self-defense, which it supposedly de-
rived from customary international law. However, not only has the
court's derived version of the doctrine under customary international
law been criticized,123 but the doctrine's application to the facts of this
case was imprecise.
Zia Modabber
123. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
